Abstract. A fundamental step in decision analysis is the elicitation of the decision-maker's preferences about the prospects of a decision situation in the form of utility values. However, this can be a difficult task to perform in practice as the number of prospects may be large, and eliciting a utility value for each prospect may be a time consuming and stressful task for the decision maker. To relieve some of the burden of this task, this paper presents a normative method to assign unbiased utility values when only incomplete preference information is available about the decision maker. We introduce the notion of a utility density function and propose a maximum entropy utility principle for utility assignment
INTRODUCTION
A fundamental step in decision analysis is the elicitation of the decision-maker's preferences about the prospects of a decision situation in the form of utility values. This is the third out of five axioms that are guaranteed to produce the best decision in any decision situation under uncertainty. [1] . These axioms are listed below:
Axiom 1. The Probability Rule
The probability rule states that you can describe the prospects of a decision situation by possibilities, and furthermore, you can specify a prior probability for each prospect. We will use the term "prospects" in this paper rather than "outcomes" or "consequences" of a decision situation as it refers to the whole future life starting at the end of a decision tree rather than just the outcome of an uncertain situation.
Axiom 2. The Order Rule
The order rule states that you can order the prospects of a decision situation from the best to the worst in a list with the best prospect at the top and the worst at the bottom. A normative justification for the requirement of the Order Rule axiom is that a decision maker who cannot order the prospects is vulnerable to being a "money pump". This is demonstrated by the following argument: If you prefer prospect A to prospect B, and Prospect B to prospect C, but you prefer prospect C to prospect A, then, starting with prospect B, you will be ready to pay money to move to prospect A. You will then be ready to pay money to move from prospect A to prospect C. Finally you will still be willing to pay to move from prospect C back to prospect B. The cycle can extend indefinitely and so you become a money pump. The preference order of the prospects will be the basic requirement of this paper in the introduction of a utility density function.
Axiom 3. The Equivalence Rule
The equivalence rule states that for any three prospects at different levels of preference, say, prospect A is preferred to prospect B which is preferred to prospect C, you can specify a probability, p, of receiving A and one minus p of receiving C that will just make you indifferent to receiving prospect B for sure. This probability is shown in figure 1 and is often referred to as the preference probability, Von Neumann and Morgenstern utility, or the Standard Gamble utility in medical literature. In this paper we mean by utility values, those preference probabilities obtained from the equivalence rule. Our goal will be to determine the utility values for a set of K ordered prospects. With no loss of generality, we will assign a utility value of 1 to the most preferred prospect, in this case A, and 0 to the least preferred prospect, C. The preference probability of prospect B is thus 1 Prospect A Prospect C FIGURE 1. Preference probability of prospect B for a p chance of prospect A and a 1-p chance of prospect C.
Axiom 4. The Substitution Rule
The substitution rule requires that if you face any of the choices used in the equivalence rule in the real world, and you assign a probability to receiving the best prospect equal to the preference probability you assigned in the equivalence rule, you remain indifferent between choosing the middle prospect or the deal that can produce the best or the worst.
Axiom 5. The Choice Rule
The choice rule is the only rule that tells you what to do. Suppose you have two alternatives, each of which has only the same two prospects, A and B. If you prefer A to B, you must choose the alternative with the higher probability of yielding A. That is, you must prefer the alternative with the higher probability of the better prospect. This is shown in figure 2 By application of the previous five rules any complex decision situation can be reduced into a set of alternatives, and furthermore each of these alternatives has only two prospects (the best and the worst). The optimal alternative to choose is the one that has the highest probability of getting the better prospect. These rules also allow us to choose the alternative that has the highest expected value of the preference probabilities for its prospects. It is now clear that the probability values assigned in step 1 and the preference probabilities (utilities) assigned in step 3 play an important role in determining the best alternative. In practice however, both the probability and utility elicitation processes are subject to many cognitive and motivational biases [2] , [3] , and [4] . Furthermore, many prospects of a decision situation may be life and death situations, such as outcomes of medical surgery where the decision-maker may not feel comfortable placing precise utility values. This often poses a problem in practice, and in addition, the number of prospects in a decision situation may grow exponentially with the number of uncertainties present, and thus the elicitation of a preference probability for each prospect can become a time-consuming and, very often, a stressful task.
In this paper we will focus in particular on the assignment of preference probabilities (utilities) for the equivalence rule. While several optimal question selection algorithms for utility elicitation have been proposed in the literature, for example [5] and [6] , a problem that is equally important to utility elicitation and has not had as much coverage is the need for a normative procedure to assign unbiased utility values based on the partial preference information we know about the decision maker. We will refer to this problem as the utility assignment problem and present a normative procedure for the assignment of preference probabilities for a set of ordered prospects.
This paper is structured as follows. We start with a review of the entropy of a random variable, and the maximum entropy principle. Next we derive the maximum entropy marginal probability distributions for the utility values of K ordered prospects and introduce two definitions -utility vector and utility increment vector -that will be used in the utility assignment problem. We will present a geometric interpretation for the utility assignment problem and illustrate how an "unbiased" assignment of utility values can be obtained. Finally, we will use the utility-increment vector definition and propose a maximum entropy utility principle to assign "unbiased" utility values for a set of ordered prospects. We will also illustrate how the results of maximum entropy utility agree with the results of the geometrical approach.
A REVIEW OF BASIC ENTROPY CONCEPTS
In 1948, Shannon introduced the term, , as a measure of uncertainty about a discrete random variable having a probability mass function p(x) [7] . He called this term the entropy, which can also be thought of as a measure of the amount of information needed to describe the outcome of a discrete random variable. For example, a random variable, X, can have four possible outcomes, {0, 1, 2, 3}, with probabilities,
, respectively. Let us calculate the entropy of X using base two for the logarithm in the entropy expression. 
One intuitive way to explain this number is to consider the minimum expected number of binary (Yes/No) questions needed to describe an outcome of X. The most efficient way to ask the questions in this example is to start by asking about the outcome with the highest probability of occurrence. i.e. we ask "Is X=0?" If it is, then we have determined X in one question. If it is not, then we ask "Is X= 1?" Again, if it is correct, then we have determined X in two questions, if it is not, we ask "Is X= 2?" We do not need to ask "Is X=3?" because if it is not 0,1 or 2 then it must be 3. The expected number of binary questions needed to determine X is then given by:
While this equality does not always hold, an optimal question selection process always exists such that the expected number of questions is bound by the following well-known data compression inequality (explained in further detail in [8] page 87):
The entropy of a discrete random variable thus provides some notion of the expected number of questions needed to describe its outcome. The fact that binary questions were used relates to the base two in the logarithm of the entropy expression.
In 1957, Jaynes built on the entropy concept and proposed a normative principle for the assignment of probabilities [9] . This is called the principle of maximum entropy and is stated as follows: "In making inferences on the basis of partial information we must use that probability distribution which has maximum entropy subject to whatever is known. This is the only unbiased assignment we can make; to use any other would amount to arbitrary assumption of information, which by hypothesis we do not have".
Jaynes' maximum entropy principle provides an excellent method for the assignment of prior probabilities in the first axiom of decision analysis. The information may be available in several forms such as moment constraints, probability constraints and shape constraints. When no information is present, the maximum entropy distribution agrees with Bayes' and Laplace's originally postulated uniform prior. In this paper we will propose an analogous maximum entropy principle for the assignment of utility values for the third axiom of decision analysis.
THE UTILITY VOLUME AND THE UTILITY SIMPLEX
We start this section with the definition of a utility vector for a set of K ordered prospects of a decision situation. A utility vector contains the utility values of the prospects starting from lowest to highest. With no loss of generality, we will assign a utility value of zero to the least preferred prospect, , and a value of one to the most preferred prospect, . The utility vector has K elements defined as 
Note that any utility vector of dimension K can be represented as a point in a K-2 dimensional space in the region defined by 0 1
This region, which we will call the utility volume, has a volume equal to
. An example of a two-dimensional utility volume is shown in Figure ( 3). 
Utility Vector Representation
The second definition is the utility-increment vector, U , whose elements are equal to the difference between the consecutive elements in the utility vector. The utilityincrement vector has ( elements defined as 1)
Note that all elements of are greater than or equal to zero and sum to one. Therefore, any utility-increment vector can be represented as a point in a (K-1) dimensional simplex Note that all points in the utility volume or the utility simplex satisfy the decisionmaker's preference ordering of the prospects but assign different utility values to them. In other words, if the problem were deterministic then any point on a given utility simplex can be used to determine the decision maker's optimal alternative since This article is copyrighted as indicated in the article. Reuse of AIP content is subject to the terms at: http://scitation. it carries the order information. When uncertainty about the prospects is present in the problem, then the precise location of the utility increment vector over the utility simplex is needed in order to help the decision maker choose the best alternative. (The best alternative is the one that has the highest expected value of the utility values for its prospects). Contrary, to the deterministic case, knowledge of the order alone is insufficient to determine the best alternative when uncertainty is present. If all we know about the decision maker's preferences is the ordering of the prospects, we need to find an "unbiased" assignment for the location of the utility increment vector over the utility simplex. We will use the maximum entropy distribution for, the location of the utility increment vector over the utility simplex. This results in a uniform distribution over the utility simplex and also has several implications about the marginal distributions for each element of the utility increment vector. Let us now show how to generate uniform samples over a utility Simplex of dimension K-1:
1. Generate a random sequence 1 
The elements 1 2 , ,........., K u u u 2 , form the unknown elements of the utility vector and also form an order statistic generated by a uniform distribution. The elements 1 2 , ,.., 1 K u u u form the co-ordinates of the utility increment vector that is uniformly sampled over the utility simplex. Now we discuss the implications this uniform sampling has on the probability density functions for the elements of the utility vector. Let us start with the element u . (1 )
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Using further properties of order statistics, [10] , we can prove Propositions 1, and 2 below.
Proposition 1: Marginal Distributions of the Utility Vector
The maximum entropy marginal distributions for the utility values of a set of K ordered prospects are the family of Beta distributions, .
Given the marginal distribution for each element in the utility vector, it is known that the logical assignment of each utility increment value is the mean of its marginal distribution [11] . The mean of a ( , 1) Beta j K j distribution is equal to , 1 j K and is the utility value you would assign to each prospect, j. The utility values for prospects j=0 and j=K-1 are deterministic with values 0 and 1 respectively.
Proposition 2: Marginal Distributions of the Utility Increment Vector
The maximum entropy marginal distributions for the elements of the utility increment vector have identical maximum entropy marginal distributions, .
Given the marginal distribution for each element in the utility increment vector, it is known that the logical assignment of each utility increment value is the mean of its marginal distribution [11] . The mean of a distribution is
. We now have a maximum entropy assignment for the location of the utility increment vector and are ready for proposition 3 below.
Proposition 3: Utility Increment Vector Assignment
The maximum entropy assignment for increments in the utility values of a set of ordered prospects yields identical increments in utility values equal to
For example, if we have a decision situation with five ordered prospects, , the maximum entropy assignment of the utility increment vector is and the maximum entropy assignment of the utility vector is U . Note that using the definitions of utility volume and utility simplex, as well as the maximum entropy uniform joint distribution, we have made an unbiased assignment of utility values for five prospects when only the preference order is known. In the next section, we will generalize the utility assignment problem and present a maximum entropy approach for the assignment of "unbiased" utility values. We will demonstrate how the same results can be obtained using a maximum entropy approach. 
THE UTILITY ASSIGNMENT PROBLEM
In this section we will make use of the previous definitions and present a method to assign "unbiased" utility values based on the partial information we know about the decision maker's preferences. We mean by "unbiased" utility values, those that do not lead to arbitrary assumptions of preference information that is not available. We will illustrate how the results obtained for utility assignment using the uniform distribution on the utility simplex can be generalized to the assignment of utility values using any information that is known about the decision maker's preferences. We will also extend the vector definitions of the previous section to the continuous case and, in particular, to the case where the prospects of the decision situation can be represented monetarily. An example of such prospects is the future revenue of a company determined by a continuous probability distribution. The ordering of the prospects in this case is a relatively straightforward task assuming the decision maker prefers more money to less.
In the continuous case the utility vector has an infinite number of elements tracing a utility curve over the domain of monetary prospects. The largest value is still 1 and the lowest value is 0 corresponding to the utility values of the best and least preferred prospects respectively. The utility-increment vector is now the derivative of the utility curve and represents a "utility density function", which is analogous to a probability density function in that it is non-negative and integrates to unity. A utility curve is thus analogous to a cumulative distribution function.
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Now the main problem of assigning unbiased utility values has been transferred to the assignment of an unbiased utility density function or a utility increment vector over a set of ordered prospects. This is analogous to the problem of assigning unbiased prior probabilities on the outcomes of a random variable when only partial information is available.
Our reasoning for the assignment of the utility increment vector will be the extension of the Principle of Insufficient Reason, where the unbiased assignment should produce equal increments unless there is preference information to support otherwise. We will also require in our assignment, the fulfillment of a basic desideratum: in two problems where we have the same order of preferences and the same preference information about the decision makers, we should assign the same utility values. Now let us generalize the assignment problem and pose the following question: "Given the partial information we know about the decision maker's preferences, what is the unbiased assignment of utility values that we should make?" Using the previous results, it is now evident how to solve our problem; in making inferences on the basis of partial preference information we must use that utility curve whose utility density function has maximum entropy subject to whatever preferences are known. This is the only unbiased assignment we can make; to use any other would amount to arbitrary assumption of preferences, which by hypothesis we do not have.
This provides a clear analogy to the maximum entropy principle introduced by Jaynes in 1957 for probability inference however here we have provided the framework for its application to utility assignment. It can be applied to both the continuous and the discrete cases. We will call the utility values obtained from this principle the maximum entropy utility values. This principle can be used to assign unbiased utility values for axiom 3, the equivalence rule, in decision analysis.
Note that this assignment also agrees with the result of Proposition 3 obtained from the maximum entropy marginal distributions: if we had maximized the entropy of the utility increment vector with ( 1) K elements and no other information except the ordering is provided, we would have obtained a vector whose elements are all equal to 1 1 K .
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have introduced the notion of a utility density function and a maximum entropy utility principle to assign unbiased utility values for a set of ordered prospects. This analogy paves the way for further research on utility assignment using the well-known results of maximum entropy probability inference. The concept of a utility density function can also extend to a joint utility density function for prospects with multiple attributes and also paves the way for further research on uninformative prior utility values and utility inference.
For example, when Jeffreys', [12] , uninformative prior, 1 ( ) , 0 x x u x is used as an uninformative utility density function, it leads to the famous logarithmic utility curve that is used very often to represent the decision maker's preferences in the literature.
From an axiomatic point of view, Shore and Johnson showed that Jaynes' maximum entropy principle for probability inference satisfies a set of reasonable axioms that stem from one fundamental principle: If a problem can be solved in more than one way, the results should be consistent [13] . They also showed that maximizing any function but the entropy will lead to inconsistencies in these axioms unless that function and the entropy have identical maxima. The analogy between probability and utility density functions makes their analysis directly applicable to the maximum entropy utility principle and so we will only recite these axioms, which are: Uniqueness, Invariance, System Independence, and Subset Independence. In addition to satisfying the previous axioms, the maximum entropy utility principle also satisfies two essential desiderata. The first desideratum, as mentioned earlier, is that for different people with the same preference ordering and where we have the same preference information we should make the same assignment of utility values. This results from the solution to the maximum entropy utility formulation. The second desideratum is -utility and probability independence-that results from the foundations of normative utility theory. The utility value of a prospect should not depend on the probability of getting that prospect due to the normative separation of beliefs from preferences.
